3 public life that assumes the existence of separate categories of religious" and political". 10 However, they also approach the judicial regulation of particular conflicts that arise in relation to issues such as symbolic endorsement of a faith by a state, or the need for laws to be justified by public reason from somewhat different starting points. These differences can, I suggest, be most instructive and can allow each system to obtain provide valuable clarification of the true principles underlying the separation of religion and state.
Indeed, while the fact that the European Court of Human Rights is an international court of limited remit may appear to weigh against recognising its jurisprudence as an informative comparator in relation to the US Supreme Court, which has greater democratic authority and a broader constitutional role, it is the limited nature of Strasbourg's remit that allows it to provide insight into important issues in First Amendment caselaw. This is because the ECtHR's concerns are limited to preventing the violation of fundamental rights. Although the Court has stated that democracy is the only system envisaged by the Convention and has noted the importance of pluralism and the idea of 'democratic society', 11 it does not have a mandate to set out or enforce desirable constitutional principles. Its only task is to rule on whether a particular action or legal arrangement on the part of a signatory state violates the rights set out in the Convention. Court has no authority to develop broader constitutional norms that aim at the proper functioning of the legal and political system or that seek to promote particular notions of citizenship or society.
Therefore, when the ECtHR addresses the relationship between religion, state and law it has limited 10 On the development of a category of "religion" as a phenomenon distinct from politics see, for example, capacities to deal with elements of this relationship that go beyond individual rights. As Judge Bonello pointed out in his concurring opinion in the Grand Chamber decision in Lautsi v Italy, the Convention has given the Court the remit to enforce freedom of religion and of conscience but has not empowered it to enforce either secularism or religious neutrality on states. He pointed out that:
'Freedom of religion is not secularism. Freedom of religion is not the separation of church and state.
Freedom of religion is not religious equidistance -all seductive notions, but of which no one has so far appointed this Court to be custodian. In Europe, secularism is an optional, freedom of religion is not'.
14 Non rights-based reasons can be recognised only indirectly by the ECtHR in that, as is discussed below, signatory states may seek to justify restrictions on religious freedom (or other Convention rights) on the basis that the restriction in question seeks to protect important constitutional principles or goals arising from national legal orders which cover much wider ground than the ECHR, but this recognition, is a mechanism for the Court to accommodate the broader constitutional choices of Member States and does not permit the Court itself to develop and impose constitutional principles that go beyond the question of the protection of fundamental rights.
This incapacity is what makes the Strasbourg Court such a useful comparator. The extent to which individual rights claims can justify the relatively strict separation between religion and state (both in terms of a requirement that government actions be supported by secular or non-religious reasons and in terms of prohibition on symbolic state endorsement of a faith) that has been required by the US Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment is of considerable importance in academic debate and in the Court's caselaw. As will be discussed below, the USSC has ruled that the state cannot symbolically endorse any particular faith but has been unclear about the degree to which this principle arises from need to protect individual rights or from broader, more pragmatically justified constitutional principles such as the risk of religious contestation for political power. This is mirrored in academic debates in academic debates where scholars such as Ronald Indeed, only a court with such a limited remit can provide this insight. National courts dealing with religious matters will face the same overlap between questions of rights and broader constitutional principles that faces the USSC. French courts will have to assess cases in the light of commitments to religious freedom alongside the 1905 law on secularism and cross cutting issues such as particular ideas of citizenship and national identity, similarly German courts will have to take into account both commitments to religious freedom and specific constitutional provisions on church state relations.
Even in the UK where the Anglican Church is established in England and where there is no codified constitution, the courts have have issued judgements on religion and its role in law and politics that speak of a form of substantive separation between religion and the legal and political order that has been justified in a leading judgement of the Court of Appeal on grounds that:
'We do not live in a society where all people share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one religion -any belief system-cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the precepts of any other. If they did, those out in the cold would be less than citizens, and our constitution would be on the way to a theocracy.'
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Notably, this approach that also leaves unclear whether the status of being 'out in the cold' is itself a rights violation or whether it is problematic for some other reason such as the likelihood that such alienation would provoke intractable political conflict.
Of course, as it is an international court the ECtHR is likely to be more deferential to state choices than the court of a nation state such as the USSC. However, this article's focus is not on the intensity 6 of review applied but rather what work ideas of religious freedom and individual rights do and do not do when courts are faced with disputes relating to the degree of separation from religion that states are required to observe. Indeed, other international courts such as the Court of Justice of the European Union that have broader remits than the ECtHR will also approach matters of state religious neutrality in a way that requires them to take account of the broader constitutional norms of the political system of the EU meaning their decisions cannot provide the same degree of insight as to the role (and limits of the role) of rights in these debates as can the caselaw of the Strasbourg Court.
Textual Differences but Similar Approaches
In textual terms, there are clear differences between the ECHR and the United States Constitution.
The First Amendment of the US Constitution covers both freedom of religion and the separation of church and state. The European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR') has Article 9 guaranteeing freedom of thought, conscience and religion but does not have an article requiring separation of church and state, something that makes the justification for interventions to support the secular nature of the state more complicated.
Despite these textual differences, both systems require limits on religious influence over law and politics. The USSC has required 'valid secular reasons' if legislation is to be held to be valid as part of a broader commitment to avoiding the "entanglement" of religion and the state. 19 The European
Court of Human Rights has approvingly mentioned the concept of secularism as being in harmony with the ECHR. 20 However it has focused, in decisions such as Refah Partisi v Turkey 21 (where it upheld the dissolution of a political party held to be seeking the establishment of a religiously-based legal order), on showing the danger to norms such a privacy, popular sovereignty and equality that the establishment of a non-secular legal or political order would bring (in this case an Islamic, Shariabased order).
As will be shown below, the European approach is underpinned by concerns that certain forms of endorsement of religion by the state may be oppressive and that the legal enforcement of particular religious values may be undemocratic or inconsistent with particular human rights such as privacy or equality. The US approach has, at least until recently, differed in that it has also been concerned with 7 avoiding entanglement of religion and state irrespective of whether the entanglement in question could be seen as oppressive or not. There has been lively academic debate over whether the singling out of religious values alone for exclusion from acting as the basis of public policy is justifiable 22 but the general approach of the majority in the USSC has (at least until recently) been to identify religious values per se, irrespective of their content as ineligible to act as the basis of law and policy and to see symbolic endorsement of a faith as problematic whether or not its overall effect is oppressive (see discussion below). 8
Separation of Religion and State under the ECHR
Similarly in Dimitras v Greece it found a violation of Article 9 in respect of rules for giving testimony in criminal cases. The relevant legislation assumed as a default that witnesses were Greek Orthodox and, in the case of those who followed a religion unrecognised by the state or who had no religion, the individual in question was required to convince the court that they held such beliefs before being allowed to make a solemn affirmation instead of swearing on the Bible. Justifying its conclusion that these rules violated the Convention, the Court noted the presumption that witnesses were Orthodox and the fact that the option of making a solemn declaration instead of swearing on the Bible was not given to Greek Orthodox individuals who preferred that option. It particularly objected to the fact that witnesses were obliged to reveal their religion to judges and noted that, should a judge fail to be convinced by a witness' evidence that she was an atheist or member of a religion that forbids the taking of oaths, she would be forced to swear on the Bible.
Worries that entanglement between the state and a favoured faith could become oppressive is also seen in a series of cases related to the teaching of religion in state schools where the Court found violations of the Convention where a mandatory curriculum endorsed the truth claims of a particular faith or when opt out mechanisms tended to disfavour or place pressure on students from other faiths. 25 Importantly, absolute equal treatment of all religions was not required. In Folgerø v.
Norway, for example, the Court did not object to the the fact that Christianity, Norway's dominant religion, received a disproportionately large amount of attention in the curriculum, but rather to the fact that the course appeared to present the teachings of Christianity as true.
26
Institutional entanglement between religion and state is the rule rather than the exception in Faced with a refusal of the Moldovan authorities to register the applicant church and allegations of serious harassment of church members, the Court set out clear limits on the powers of the state to regulate religious life stating that Article 9 precluded:
'State measures favouring a particular leader or specific organs of a divided religious community or seeking to compel the community or part of it to place itself, against its will, under a single leadership, would also constitute an infringement of the freedom of religion. In democratic societies the State does not need to take measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought under a unified leadership.'
36
The Court noted that under Moldovan law only recognised religions could be practised and that unrecognised religions could not obtain legal personality, engage clergy or sell religious items as well. It also noted serious allegations that the those belonging to applicant church had been subject to intimidation and harassment and found that the lack of legal recognition had aggravated this situation.
37
We can therefore see the outlines of a framework within which the ECtHR approaches the relationship between religion and state. Strict religious neutrality is not required by the Convention.
States may symbolically associate themselves with a particular faith or give a culturally-entrenched faith particular prominence in the education system provided the overall effect is not oppressive of religious freedom. As Leigh and Ahdar rightly observe, the test is oppression not neutrality. 38 The entanglement between religion and the state must be sufficiently intense so as to impose clear burdens on the free practise of religion in order for it to violate Article 9. The presence of a crucifix on the wall of a school may produce a sense of alienation but this will not violate the ECHR. The cases where a violation has been found have involved direct teaching of religious truth 39 or the forcing of individuals to either recite a religious oath or publically justify their faith to a public 
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between the state and the rival to the applicant church lay behind the failure of the State to recognise the latter and its toleration of acts of harassment and intimidation. However, it was the non-recognition and acts of intimidation that constituted the violation, not the existence of official links between the Moldovan state and a particular faith that constituted the violation of Article 9.
The very limited nature of degree of separation between religion and state imposed by the ECtHR underlines how the Strasbourg Court will always struggle to fulfil the role of constitutional court for
Europe. As noted above, while constitutional courts are often charged with upholding fundamental rights, they also have jurisdiction to protect fundamental principles of the legal and political order, such as separation of religion and state, the justification for which may not be solely rights-based.
Because the Court of Human Rights, in contrast, has jurisdiction over rights issues alone, it can promote or restrict principles such as separation of religion and state only insofar as they impact on the protection of the rights in the Convention. Thus, the lack of a non-establishment clause in the ECHR means that the Court will intervene only when the degree of identification between the state and a faith becomes a threat to fundamental rights. The ECHR's separation is a minimal one that can accommodate symbolic preference on the part of the state for a particular faith. Indeed, it is possible that, if the ruling religion's theology was sufficiently liberal, the Convention may even be able to accommodate a rights-friendly theocracy.
(b) Indirect Recognition of Non-Rights Based Reasons for Separation: Accommodating

Constitutional Choices of Member States
The limits on ECtHR's ability to take account of non-rights based values and concerns are not absolute. The Strasbourg Court can indirectly rule on these matters in so far as Member States are entitled to rely on non-rights goals as grounds for justification for restriction of fundamental rights.
To do so they must fit these goals into the text of the relevant Convention right which sets out permissible reasons to restrict the right in question. In relation to Article 9 (the most relevant article for our purposes), the relevant provision envisages that the right to freedom of religion can be restricted only 'in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others'. 40 As will be discussed below, the narrow nature of these provisions poses problems for States who wish to rely on aims such as promotion of coexistence or political stability to justify restriction of religious expression in state contexts. 
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criticised for failing to be fully frank about the reality that, in finding in favour of the French State, the Court effectively gave scope to states to pursue (through the principle of strict secularism) goals such as 'peaceful coexistence' that were not directly aimed at protecting the rights of others while at the same time claiming that the action of the French authorities was one which aimed at defending the rights of others.
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To summarise, the Strasbourg Court's approach to cases relating to the relationship between religion, state and law is heavily affected by its rights-focus. This is seen when it is required to assess the compatibility of policies adopted by states, such as France or Turkey, that pursue (or pursued) a thick version of secularism that may aim to achieve goals that are not only rights-focused. Even though the Court has given wide latitude to states in such cases it has only been able to do so by stretching the concept of the protection of the rights of others. This rights focus, coupled with the fact that the text of the Convention provides limited scope for restricting rights on the basis of abstract constitutional principles means that the Court has has had to shoe-horn the defence of abstract secularism into the concept of the protection of the rights and freedoms of others as in (Ebrahimian and Sahin) or has had to identify threats to rights in the challenges to secularist norms mounted by those who seek a more assertive or visible religious presence in politics or state contexts (Dahlab, Refah Partisi). However, this identification of threats leads the Court into highly problematic territory to which I now turn.
Rights-Focus and Assessment of the Substance of Religious Beliefs
As it has felt it necessary to seek justification for secularist state measures in rights terms, and as it can only intervene to require limits on state identification with a particular faith when such identification can be shown to be oppressive of fundamental rights, the Strasbourg Court has been led into offering assessments of the degree to which the beliefs or claims of particular faiths (usually However, the correctness of the court's analysis of Islam in these cases and the degree to which such statements can be problematic in the light of undoubted societal discrimination against Muslims in Europe, are important questions but they are not the focus of this paper. What is significant for our purposes is to think why the Court has entered into assessment of the substance of religious beliefs which so many courts studiously avoid and which its own Article 9 jurisprudence counsels against (the Court has repeatedly said in Article 9 cases that it is impermissible for the state to 'assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs'). 17 poorly equipped to carry out) and assessing whether such interpretations conform to human rights norms. The Strasbourg Court's dangerous forays into assessment of the compatibility of particular religious beliefs comes, I suggest, from the fact that, unlike the US Supreme Court, it is interpreting a text that lacks a non-establishment clause and that provides limited grounds for justifying state restrictions of fundamental rights largely on grounds other than the protection of other fundamental rights.
Summary: The Features of A Rights-Based Justification of Separation
These cases show us what separation which draws its justification from the need to protect fundamental rights and which has a limited capacity to draw justification from broader non-rights based goals looks like. Being very restricted in its ability to draw on broader constitutional principles, the ECtHR's version of separation is characterised by a very limited mandatory degree of separation (it precludes only oppressive entanglement) and pressure to engage in controversial assessments of the substance of religious beliefs in order to verify whether the religion in question may represent a threat to fundamental rights if given a significant public role. By providing a 'laboratory conditions' where issues of separation of religion and state can be examined through a fundamental rights lense with other broader constitutional principles largely excluded, the Strasbourg caselaw shows particularly clearly what work rights do and do not do in this area as well as the potential problems of according rights questions too much importance in our analysis of these issues as they arise in national legal orders that are not subject to the jurisdictional and textual limits of the ECtHR. This is an important issue for US constitutional law. The First Amendment contains both a fundamental rights element (free exercise of religion) and an abstract constitutional principle (nonestablishment) and the degree to which the latter relies on the former for its justification has not always been clear. In addition, some leading proponents of reading the First Amendment as imposing a stringent obligation of religious neutrality on the state have argued for this position on the basis that entanglement of religion and state violates fundamental rights, a position which the outcome of the fundamental rights focused rulings of the Strasbourg Court renders questionable.
US Approach: Entanglement v Right to Equal Treatment or Not to Feel Alienated
There has been an enormous volume of jurisprudence and scholarship in relation to the requirements and underlying rationale of the non-establishment clause of the First Amendment.
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My purpose is to focus on one element of these debates, the use of rights as a justification for such separation and the negative consequences of such use for those who advocate maximal state neutrality in relation to religion. The first thing to note is that that US Supreme Court has, in general, mandated a far greater degree of separation than the ECtHR. It has held that states should not appear to symbolically endorse any particular faith and has, until recently at least, not required that a symbolic endorsement appear to be oppressive for it to be unconstitutional. It has also strengthened adherence to the principle that a distinction ought to be maintained between religion and law by requiring that legislation be justified by valid secular reasons as part of its overall view that the First Amendment precludes excessive "entanglement" of religion and state.
In the famous Lemon decision 66 the Court held that the First Amendment precluded the government from either advancing or hindering religion and rendered unconstitutional any measures involving excessive "entanglement" between government and religion. It justified this conclusion on the basis that political division along religious lines risked fragmentation and divisiveness and was one of the evils the First Amendment sought to prevent. Notably, this is a justification that relies not on showing violation of the rights of any individual but on a principle about how best to share a single set of political institutions in a religiously-diverse society. The "Lemon Test" has proved controversial but the view that separation draws much of its justification from pragmatic or prudential views on The Court has stressed that the test is not a rigid or absolute one and was willing to uphold a municipal nativity scene in Lynch v Donnelly on the grounds that, 'whatever benefit there is to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental' and that the authorities had 'a secular purpose for including the crèche (…) [had] not impermissibly advanced religion, and (…) [did] not create excessive entanglement between religion and government.' 71 But, even on occasions when religiously-specific displays have been upheld, this was justified the basis of a framework of analysis that saw non-establishment as having a justification relating to avoiding entanglement of religion and state that was, by itself, sufficient to trigger a finding of unconstitutionality without it being necessary to consider whether the non-establishment in question was in some way oppressive of fundamental rights such as religious freedom. On this approach, symbolic governmental endorsement of a religion that was oppressive of the religious freedom of others would certainly be unconstitutional, but non-oppressive endorsement would also be unconstitutional as it would 'entangle' religion and state and could lead to conflict between faiths for control of the 
Rights-Based Defences of Non-Establishment
The idea that separation can be justified on the basis of an individual right has surfaced both in the caselaw and in leading academic defences of separation. In the same opinion in which she cited the dangers of political instability and violence in finding the display of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse was unconstitutional ( Though such an approach appears to mandate maximal symbolic neutrality, it ultimately undermines the case for such neutrality the separation of church and state by locating its justification in a rights claim that is weak. As Laborde has pointed out, hurt feelings or a sense that the state does not share requires that such disputes be parked and that state institutions remain "neutral" on these divides.
More importantly for our purposes, none of these theorists shown why there should be a right to have the state avoid expressing disagreement with your religious (or other beliefs) or why expression on the part of a state of religious belief amounts to a violation of a right to equality (or any other recognised fundamental right). States embrace a range of beliefs and values such as gender equality, racial equality, rejection of monarchy or freedom of religion that may be alienating to some who hold different views. There is no recognised human right not to feel alienated, not to hear particular kinds of arguments in political life or not to see particular symbols in state contexts.
As the result in Lautsi showed, to rise to the level of actual threats to fundamental rights, symbolic links on the part of the state to a particular faith need to be sufficiently intense to become oppressive of a recognised right such as freedom of religion or parental autonomy in relation to the upbringing of children.
The dangers in a rights-focused approach for those who favour separation is seen in the recent case of Town of Greece v Galloway. 83 In this case, Kennedy J, writing for the majority, articulated a test for regulating prayer in state contexts that moves closer to the focus on oppression seen in Lautsi, Dimitras and Buscarini and away from the idea of avoiding any (even slight) entanglement. In my view this is not the correct approach but is a logical conclusion of the growth in the academic and judicial focus on non-establishment as a matter of rights. In this case the majority upheld the practice of opening meetings of the town council with a sectarian prayer (in practice almost always Christian). Kennedy J adopted an approach that identified the test for constitutionality as one focused on 'impermissible coercion'. He argued that 'legislative bodies do not engage in impermissible coercion by merely exposing constituents to prayer they would rather not hear and in Viewed in this way, trivial instances of state endorsement of a faith in a school are not problematic because they violate the rights of students or parents but because they risk competition amongst religious groups to control the education system in order to use it to promote their faith. Similarly, using religious arguments in law-making is problematic not because the majorities cannot force people to take or refrain from particular actions (this happens regularly for non-religious reasons).
Instead it is to be avoided because it undermines the ethic of citizenship, represents a failure to internalize the legitimacy and permanence of religious difference and undermines the idea of the law-making arena as a place where we make an effort to transcend religious differences thus undermining the incentives for political minorities to accept the legislative verdicts of a religious majority. Allowing a particular faith to play a symbolic or other role in state bodies, in other words, undermines the ability of such institutions to institutionalise cooperation amongst a population of diverse religious views and identities. Indeed, many who favour granting religion a broad social role reject the idea of state establishment of faith on the basis that connection to the state risks sapping the vitality or imperilling the religious freedom of the faith so established. 92 A full defense of such principles would require a monograph so it is not my intention to set out the full case in favour of separation here but rather to show that such non-rights justifications exist and that they do not suffer from the inherent inability to control minor violations of state neutrality that apply to rightsbased justifications.
91 Cecile Laborde provides a useful disaggregation of reasons that religious politics may be in tension with the liberal state in her forthcoming work LIBERALISM'S RELIGION (forthcoming, Harvard University Press). It should also be noted that there may be individual forms of religion that lack the destabilising characteristics that motivate the decision to seek to separate religion from politics and the state. However, the mechanism chosen to allow such separation to coexist with continued religious belief amongst the citizenry depends on a refusal to look at the content of religious beliefs in determining their admissibility as reasons justifying legal or political acts but focusing only on the fact that the relevant beliefs fall within the category of religion. Such an approach permits the cognitive dissonance that permits individuals, for example to vote in favour of legal toleration of that which may be religiously forbidden without abandoning their religious identity. Full treatment of this argument and the question of the definition of religion are beyond the scope of this paper.
92 R Stark and LR Iannaccone, 'A supply-side reinterpretation of the "secularization" of Europe ' (1994) 33 (3) Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 230.
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Conclusion
The jurisprudence of a rights court such as the ECtHR which deals with issues of freedom of religion and the separation of religion and state in the absence of a non-establishment clause can provide a useful perspective for the USSC on the true goals underpinning the non-establishment part of the First Amendment. This lesson is that rights-based justifications for non-establishment are weak and ultimately (as in Town of Greece) undermine the principle of non-establishment.
One of the valuable features of US jurisprudence (no doubt linked to presence of a nonestablishment clause) is the absence of judicial opining on the compatibility of the substance of the beliefs of particular religious traditions with liberal democracy. The ECtHR has been right to see that religion taking over the state can be oppressive and to state that secularism is a principle which is in line with the democratic and liberal values of the ECHR. Post-Lautsi, it is also clear that the Court recognises that, given its narrow, rights-focused mandate, mild non-oppressive forms of establishment, whether or not they are desirable (or wise in a diversifying religious context) are not for the Court to disturb.
At the same time, the Strasbourg Court must develop tools to allow its rights-focused approach to take adequate account of the non-rights based but legitimate reasons which may underpin restrictions on religious expression in particular contexts in order to preserve the religious neutrality of the state. Moreover, it needs to do so in ways that avoid the kind of pronouncements on the substantive beliefs of particular faiths that were seen in Refah, Shahin and Dahlab. Therefore rather than identifying the Islamic headscarf as hard to reconcile with gender equality as it did in Dahlab, it could restrict itself to noting that a desire to have a school system characterised by religious neutrality is legitimate. There are some positive signs in this regard. In SAS v France (which, it should be noted, related to an extreme religious symbol in social life rather than the relationship between religion and the state) the Court managed to avoid attributing particular meanings to the Islamic face-veil and instead upheld the French prohibition on the public wearing of such garments on the basis that the State had the power 'secure the conditions whereby individuals can live together in their diversity'. 93 The decision in Ebrahimian v France was also notable for its lack of any statements by the judges attributing particular meanings to the headscarf. The Ebrahimian judgment also appeared give scope to states to pursue policies such as French-style state secularism whose aims are not solely rights based but also seek to promote coexistence and political stability by setting 93 [2014] ECHR 695, paragraph 141.
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down rules that aim to allow a religiously-diverse population to share a single set of state institutions.
94
In both SAS and Ebrahimian the majority decision was criticised by the dissenting judges on the basis that recognising abstract principles risked allowing restriction of religious freedom on grounds that are overly vague 95 and in Ebrahimian the court appears not to have been fully upfront about the fact that it was in fact allowing abstract principles to restrict fundamental rights. Other critics have rightly noted the danger for minority rights of allowing fundamental rights to be restricted on grounds other than protecting rights and freedoms. 96 The dissenting judges are right that the majority's reading of this term is strained. However, it is necessary to consider whether any other approach is 
